Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?

The peace process between Alvaro Uribe's government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) risks failure unless both parties establish the trust needed to overcome substantive bottlenecks.

Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?,* the latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the need for the government and the ELN, much the smaller of the country's two left-wing insurgencies, to restore momentum in their negotiations, including unilateral measures to stimulate confidence. Establishing a ceasefire is central to success but while the government wants the ELN to concentrate in specific locations and identify its combatants, the rebels feel that they must stay mobile within specified corridors to ensure their protection, including against the more powerful FARC. Both agree de-mining and a halt to kidnapping would be important steps but questions remain about their viability outside the framework of a ceasefire.

"The mutual distrust explains why no ceasefire has been agreed", says Crisis Group Analyst Juan Munévar. "The government suspects the ELN will continue to do intelligence, logistical and political work through its urban militias, and the ELN believes the government wants combatant identification only to gain a military advantage in case negotiations break down".

The peace process has moved from an exploratory phase towards a formal dialogue, with the accompaniment of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. However, eight rounds of talks since December 2005 have not yet produced tangible results. While Uribe's tough security policy has reduced the ELN's military capability, the group has managed to survive by staying mobile and adapting to local conflict conditions.

In order for the peace process not only to continue, but to succeed, it is paramount to focus on incentives and guarantees that will help overcome bottlenecks. The ELN and the government should make unilateral goodwill gestures with the aim of establishing mutual trust. The ELN should release kidnap victims, de-mine some areas, make available information on what percentage of its combatants and unarmed militias are women and children and propose a model for ceasefire implementation and verification.

The Uribe administration should be more flexible on a complete cessation of hostilities and the concentration and identification of ELN troops in a ceasefire. Norway, Spain and Switzerland should consider offering their know-how on implementation of ceasefires, temporary concentrations of fighters, protected corridors and third-party verification.

"Many in Colombia believe the ELN is no longer a threat, so the government is under no pressure to conclude the negotiations", says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group's Latin America Program Director. "This reasoning is flawed. The ELN is not defeated, and unless the parties overcome their recalcitrance, the peace process may fail".

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP http://www.crisisgroup.org is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation covering some 60 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.